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GRUTTER V. BOLLINGER:
SETTING A PATH FOR DIVERSITY AT THE
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH CAROLINA SCHOOL OF LAW
I. INTRODUCTION
Affirmative action is one of the most controversial topics that the United States
Supreme Court has addressed in recent years. While the trend has been to move
away from affirmative action policies, the Supreme Court upheld race-based
preferences aimed at promoting diversity in student bodies of higher educational
institutions.' In the 1970s, the Court determined in Regents of the University of
California v. Bakke2 that states are permitted to use race as a factor in university
admissions policies.3 However, this determination remained tentative until recently.
The Court in Bakke did not reach a majority opinion regarding which compelling
state interests justify the use of race in admissions decisions. Thus, for the past few
decades, the state of affirmative action in admissions decisions hung in limbo while
interested parties sought to define that "compelling interest."
4
The Supreme Court recently decided two cases on this issue and conclusively
held that the attainment of educational diversity can be a compelling state interest
that justifies the use of narrowly tailored race-based preferences in university
admissions decisions.5 Racial minority status may be taken into account through
holistic, individualized review rather than quotas or automatic advantages,
6 and it
must be viewed as only one factor out of many that may contribute to diversity.
7
The Supreme Court's decision in Grutter v. Bollinger, was a surprising victory
for proponents of affirmative action, especially in light of the Court's retreat from
affirmative action in other areas.9 Before Grutter, many institutions avoided this
controversial topic and chose not to have formal policies that took race into account,
due to a concern over the issue's unsettled constitutionality.
The University of South Carolina School of Law (USC School of Law) has not
adopted a formal affirmative action policy. In light of the Supreme Court's
decisions in Grutter and Gratz, this Note explores the USC School of Law's
1. Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003).
2. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
3. Id. at 320.
4. See Carla D. Pratt, In the Wake of Hopwood: An Update on Affirmative Action in 
the
Education Arena, 42 HoW. L.J. 451, 459 (1999).
5. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2347; Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2411, 2426-27 (2003).
6. Gratz, 123 S. Ct. at 2428.
7. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2344.
8. 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003).
9. After establishing that affirmative action programs must pass strict scrutiny in Adarand
Constructors, Inc., v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995), affirmative action had subsequently fallen out of
favor until Grutter and Gratz.
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admissions policy and suggests some particular language that the school should
adopt as a starting point for formally recognizing racial diversity in its admissions
decisions.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Regents of the University of California v. Bakke
Prior to Grutter and Gratz, the Supreme Court's leading case examining the use
of race-based policies in university admissions was Regents of the University of
California v. Bakke.'0 In Bakke, the admissions policy at the Medical School of the
University of California (Medical School) assured the admission of a set number of
minority students each year. " The Medical School operated a "special admissions
program" for minorities, separate from the regular admissions program, so that
minorities and non-minorities did not compete against one another for admission. 2
A white male, Allan Bakke, who applied to the school in two consecutive years,
brought an action against the Medical School seeking mandatory, injunctive, and
declaratory relief compelling his admission to the school. 3 Bakke's application was
considered under the University's general admission program both years and was
rejected.' 4 Bakke claimed that the school's special admissions program effectively
excluded his admission on the basis of race, which violated his rights under the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution, the California State Constitution, and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964.'"
The state courts which considered Bakke determined that the admissions policy
was unconstitutional race-based discrimination.16 The Supreme Court of California
ordered the Medical School to admit Bakke to the school. 7 The United States
Supreme Court then granted certiorari to consider the issue.' 8
As evidenced by six separate opinions, Bakke posed a difficult question to the
Supreme Court. Justice Powell's opinion announcing the Court's judgment
invalidated the Medical School's admissions program, but reversed the state court's
decision prohibiting affirmative action programs from considering race.'9 In a
concurring opinion, Justices Stevens, Stewart, Rehnquist, and Chief Justice Burger
did not reach the issue of whether the admissions policy passed strict scrutiny and
10. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
11. Id. at 269-70.
12. Id. at 272-73.
13. Id. at 276-77.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 277-78.
16. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 279-80 (1978).
17. Id. at 281.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 320.
[Vol. 55:531
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instead determined that the program violated Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.0 Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun dissented, proposing a
two-part test that held universities may use race in their admissions decisions to
remedy past discrimination of the university itself or society as a whole, as long as
this use of race is reasonable in light of the plan and overall objectives and would
not stigmatize discrete groups or individuals.
21 Under this test, the dissenting
justices would have upheld the Medical School's admissions 
program. 22
Justice Powell provided the critical fifth vote for striking down the Medical
School's two-track admissions program. In a portion of his opinion not joined by
the otherjustices, Justice Powell stated that the attainment of a diverse student body
is a compelling governmental interest and the only interest in this case to survive
strict scrutiny.23 He pointed specifically to the undergraduate admissions plan at
Harvard University as an example of a permissible policy that factors race into
admissions decisions. 24 At Harvard, the admissions program considered race as a
"plus factor," while not insulating any individual applicant from comparison with
applicants of other races.25 Under the Harvard system, an applicant's race is
factored into consideration for admission, yet his or her minority status is not
decisive when compared with other applicants who may contribute to the diversity
of the student body in ways other than through their race or ethnic background.
26
Justice Powell hailed the Harvard admissions program as an "illuminating example"
of a program that promotes educational diversity without using a quota system.
27
Although it was not the holding of the Court, Powell's plurality opinion became
the test for constitutional analysis of admissions policies using race as a factor in the
decision-making process. 28 As a result, many schools around the country patterned
their admission policies on Justice Powell's opinion and the Harvard plan described
in it.
Even though Justice Powell's decision was widely accepted as the standard for
affirmative action in educational settings, the topic still gave rise to much litigation.
The constitutionality of affirmative action in university admissions programs was
unclear, and courts were divided as to whether Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke
was controlling. In the post-Bakke era, the Supreme Court decided Adarand
20. Id. at421.
21. Id. at 325.
22. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 379 (1978).
23. Id. at 311-12.
24. Id. at 316.
25. Id. at 317.
26. Id.
27. Id. at316.
28. See Smith v. Univ. of Wash. Law Sch., 233 F.3d 1188, 1199 (9th Cir. 2000) (applying the
test established in Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (citation omitted), "[w]hen a
fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five
Justices, 'the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who
concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds"'). Smith joined other authorities in concluding
that, following the Marks ruling, Justice Powell's analysis constituted the holding of the Court in
Bakke. Smith, 233 F.3d at 1200.
2004]
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Constructors, Inc., v. Pena,2 9 which held that all racial classifications, even those
classifications that aim to benefit minorities, must pass strict scrutiny."a Although
Adarand was not meant to end affirmative action," many believed it would serve
as a death knell because the imposition of strict scrutiny is usually fatal.32
The lower courts were split on how to apply Bakke in the educational context
in light of Adarand, and whether Bakke would even be upheld if the Court were to
consider the issue again. In Hopwood v. Texas,3" the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit rejected Justice Powell's diversity rationale in Bakke
and held that remedying a university's own prior discrimination was the only
compelling interest for race-based preferences in university admissions. 4  In
Johnson v. Board ofRegents of the University of Georgia,35 the Eleventh Circuit
refrained from determining whether diversity is a compelling interest to support the
constitutionality of racial preferences in university admissions.36 The Court opined,
in dicta, that Justice Powell's opinion did not establish diversity as a compelling
interest.37 However, in Smith v. University of Washington, Law School,38 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit adopted Justice Powell's view that the
attainment of a diverse student body is a compelling state interest.39
After several decades of instability and confusion in this area, the Supreme
Court recently revisited the issue of race as a factor in university admissions
decisions. In both Grutter and Gratz, the Court determined that narrowly tailored
university admissions policies which consider the race of the applicant may indeed
pass strict scrutiny and that the attainment of educational diversity is a compelling
state interest.
B. Grutter v. Bollinger and Gratz v. Bollinger
The recent decisions of Grutter v. Bollinger4" and Gratz v. Bollinger4
concerned the admissions policies of the University of Michigan Law School and
undergraduate college, respectively.42 These opinions followed Justice Powell's
29. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
30. Id. at 227.
31. See id. at 237 (stating that strict scrutiny is not "strict in theory, but fatal in fact").
32. See, e.g., Margaret A. Sewell, Note, Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena: The Armageddon
of Affirmative Action, 46 DEPAUL L. REv. 611, 612 (1997) (predicting Adarand would lead to the
demise of affirmative action plans).
33. 236 F.3d 256 (5th Cir. 2000).
34. Id. at 275.
35. 263 F.3d 1234 (11th Cir. 2001).
36. Id. at 1244-45.
37. Id.
38. 233 F.3d 1188 (9th Cir. 2000).
39. Id. at 1201.
40. 123 S. Ct. 2411 (2003).
41. 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003).
42. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. 2325; Gratz, 123 S. Ct. 2411.
[Vol. 55:531
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reasoning in Bakke and held that educational diversity is a compelling interest.
43
However, the use of race as a factor in attaining such diversity is subject to some
limitations.44 In Grutter, Justice O'Connor expressly embraced Powell's opinion
in Bakke, stating, "today we endorse Justice Powell's view that student body
diversity is a compelling state interest that can justify the use of race in university
admissions.' '4' Because Grutter more thoroughly sets out the test of how a
university should factor race into its admissions policy, this Note focuses more
closely on it. However, a brief discussion of Gratz is necessary for a thorough
understanding of the law of race-based preferences in university admissions.
In Gratz, two white in-state applicants were denied admission to the University
of Michigan College of Literature, Science, and the Arts (LSA) in 1995 and 1997,
respectively.46 They filed a class action lawsuit against the school alleging that the
school's race-based preferences in the admissions process violated the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution,
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
47 The policy at
issue in Gratz combined a "selection index"-numerical scores calculated for each
applicant-along with a system of individualized review.
48 Applicants needed a
"selection index" score of at least 100 out of the possible 150 to qualify for the
"admit" category.49 Points were awarded for high school grade point average, as
well as other criteria concerning the applicant's high school education and
activities.50 There was a miscellaneous category under which applicants were given
20 points if the applicant was part of a minority racial or ethnic group.
5
Additionally, counselors had discretion to "flag" applications for further individual
consideration if the applicant demonstrated that, in addition to being a strong
candidate, he or she possessed certain qualities or characteristics, including minority
status, that would enhance the makeup of the student body.
52 Decisions were then
made regarding whether each flagged applicant should be admitted, postponed, or
denied.53
The district court adopted Justice Powell's diversity rationale in Bakke, and
found that the University of Michigan LSA admissions guidelines were narrowly
tailored towards attaining a diverse student body.
54 Although it entailed a points
43. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2336-37.
44. Id. at 2337.
45. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2337.
46. Gratz, 123 S. Ct. at 2417.
47. Id. at 2418.
48. Id. at 2419- 20.
49. Id. at 2419.
50. Id. Points were also awarded for "standardized test scores, academic quality of an applicant's
high school, strength or weakness of high school curriculum, in-state residency, alumni relationship,
personal essay, and personal achievement or leadership." Id.
51. Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2411, 2419 (2003).
52. Id. at 2420.
53. Id.
54. Gratz v. Bollinger, 122 F. Supp. 2d 811, 824-27 (E.D. Mich. 2000).
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW20041
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system for various categories, the district court determined that the system was not
equivalent to a quota because of the individualized review.5- On appeal, the Sixth
Circuit had not yet rendered an opinion when the United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari.
The United States Supreme Court disagreed with the district court's finding that
the University of Michigan LSA's admissions policy was narrowly tailored. 6 The
Court stated that giving preferential treatment to members of a racial or ethnic group
on that basis alone constituted "'discrimination for its own sake"' and was
unconstitutional. 7 The Court stressed that race may only be used to augment the
different qualities of an applicant; it is not to be the deciding factor.5 8 The Court
also emphasized the disparity of the admissions policy's treatment of different
factors that could contribute to diversity, noting that while a minority applicant
would be awarded twenty points, a non-minority student with "extraordinary artistic
talent" could only be awarded five points for their potential contribution to
diversity.5 9 The school's system of "individualized review" was applied in a
manner that was anything but individualized. 0 Instead ofemploying holistic review
for each applicant, there was only a possibility of being flagged for individualized
consideration. Because applicants still had to receive a certain score before their
application was eligible to be flagged for consideration, the points system was still
determinative of an applicant's admission.6 '
In contrast to Gratz, the policy at issue in Grutter was narrowly tailored.
Grutter concerned a white applicant to the University of Michigan Law School who
was denied admission.62 The petitioner, Grutter, had a 3.8 grade point average and
a 161 on her LSAT. 63 Grutter was originally put on the waiting list, but was
ultimately rejected. 64 She filed suit against the University of Michigan, claiming
that its admissions policy discriminated on the basis of race and thus violated the
Fourteenth Amendment, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981.65 The district court found the university's use of race unconstitutional,
holding that the goal of educational diversity is not a compelling governmental
55. Id. at 829.
56. Gratz, 123 S. Ct. at 2427.
57. Id. at 2428 (quoting Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307 (1978)).
58. Id.
59. Id. at 2429.
60. Id. at 2428.
61. Id. at 2416.
62. Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2332 (2003).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides "no person in the United States shall,on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits
of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financialassistance." 42 U.S.C. § 2000d. Further, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 provides that "[a]ll persons within thejurisdiction of the United States shall have ... the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedingsfor the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens." 42 U.S.C. § 198 1(a).
[Vol. 55:531
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interest and concluding that Bakke did not establish it as such.
66 The district court
held that, in light ofAdarand, the only justification for using race-based preferences
is to "remedy carefully documented effects of past discrimination.""
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit reversed the district court's judgment and adopted
Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke as binding precedent-educational diversity is
a compelling state interest.6 The court of appeals also determined that the use of
race in the law school's admissions policy was narrowly tailored because it was
only a "potential plus factor" and because the admissions policy at the University
of Michigan Law School was based on the Harvard plan that Powell approved of
in his Bakke opinion."
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine "[wihether diversity is a
compelling interest that can justify the narrowly tailored use of race in selecting
applicants for admission to public universities."70 The Court answered
affirmatively.7
The Supreme Court gave significant deference to the University of Michigan
Law School's interest in determining for itself what is important to its success as an
educational institution.72 The admissions policy sought to admit what it termed a
"critical mass" of"underrepresented minority students" to the entering class.73 The
goal of attaining a "critical mass" of minorities passes strict scrutiny, because rather
than setting aside a specific amount of seats or percentage of the class, the
admissions committee sought to admit a meaningful number of underrepresented
minorities.74
Race is not the principal criterion in determining whether an applicant should
be admitted.75 Instead, the University of Michigan Law School employs a holistic
approach, reviewing each individual's file to determine how they would enhance
diversity at the school.76 It is precisely this flexibility that is key to the
constitutionality of an admissions policy.
77
To be constitutional, the use of race in the admissions system must be narrowly
tailored to achieve the stated purpose.78 The Grutter Court used strict scrutiny to
determine if the use of race as a factor in the admissions process was closely tied
to achieving diversity, making sure there was no illegitimate racial motive
66. Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 821, 844 (E.D. Mich. 2001).
67. Id. at 848-49.
68. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2335.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 2339.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 2332.
74. Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2342 (2003).
75. Id. at 2334.
76. Id. at 2343.
77. Id. at 2342.
78. Id. at 2341.
2004]
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underlying the use of race in this case.79 To be narrowly tailored, an admissions
system must not employ a quota or a separate admissions track for minority and
non-minority applicants. Instead, it must incorporate race as a "plus factor," one
among many that could contribute to diversity, rather than act as a determinative
factor.8 0 Although numbers were a focus, the Supreme Court found the program did
not function as a quota" because the goal was an adequate representation of
minority students, rather than a specific numerical target.8 2
Mere lack of a quota is not prima facie evidence that the admissions policy is
constitutional. 3 The program must analyze each applicant individually and must
remain flexible. 4 The individual's race cannot be the "defining feature" of an
application. The admissions policy in Grutter met the test of individual review by
allowing each applicant the opportunity to explain in a personal statement, letters
of recommendation, and an essay how they would contribute to the diversity of the
school.8 6
III. ADMISSIONS DECISIONS AT THE USC SCHOOL OF LAW
The importance of increasing the presence of underrepresented minorities in
legal educational institutions is evidenced in the ABA's Standards for Approval of
Law Schools and Interpretations (Standards).87 In accordance with Grutter, the
Standards state admission may not be denied to an individual on the basis of race,
but later notes:
[A] law school shall demonstrate ... a commitment to providing
full opportunities for the study of law and entry into the profession
by qualified members of groups, notably racial and ethnic
minorities, which have been victims of discrimination in various
forms. This commitment typically includes a special concern for
determining the potential of these applicants through the
admission process .... 8
Clearly, diverse law school student bodies are a priority for the ABA.
79. Id. For examples of illegitimate racial motives, see Richmond v. JA. Croson Co., 488 U.S.
469,493 (1989).
80. Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2330 (2003).
81. Id. at 2343.
82. Id. at 2342-43.
83. Id. at 2343.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2344 (2003).
87. A.B.A. STANDARDS FOR APPROVALOF LAWSCHOOLS AND INTERPRETATIONS, at http://www.
abanet.org/legaled/standards/chapter2.html (last visited Mar. 8, 2004).
88. Id., ch. 2, Std. 211, at http://www.abanet.org/legaled/standards/chapter 2.html (last visited
Mar. 8, 2004) (emphasis added).
[Vol. 55:531
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Additionally, national statistics make it apparent that action must be taken to
improve the representation of minority groups in law schools. While it is difficult
to ascertain the percentage of lawyers in the United States that are minorities,
surveys estimate that minority representation in the nation's legal community is
around ten percent."' Minority representation in the South Carolina legal
community is below the national estimate, although the data is incomplete.
9"
The University of South Carolina School of Law's admissions policy does not
formally take the race of the applicant into consideration.9 Until the Michigan
decisions, the constitutionality of race as a factor in admissions was unclear, and the
USC School of Law's admissions policy avoided broaching the issue. However,
now that the Supreme Court has determined that the attainment of diversity in
educational environments is a compelling state interest, it seems appropriate for the
USC School of Law to reevaluate its position.
The number of minority students that attend the USC School ofLaw is critically
low. It is significantly lower proportionally than the representation of minority law
students nationwide.92 The USC School of Law Class of 2005 is seven percent
minority, totaling sixteen minority students in the fall 2002 entering class.
9 3 This
statistic gives rise to a need for affirmative action. Although the statistical analysis
set forth in Grutter cannot be applied wholesale to the USC School of Law,
9' it does
provide a glimpse into the need for changes in admissions policy. In Grutter, the
University of Michigan Law School's expert, Dr. Stephen Raudenbush, testified
that use of"a race-blind admissions system would have a 'very dramatic,' negative
effect on underrepresented minority admissions," leading to minority representation
around four percent instead of the actual fourteen percent.95
The USC School of Law admissions policy currently states that an admissions
committee comprised of faculty representatives and the dean of admissions reviews
89. See generally Goal IX Report: The Status of Racial and Ethnic Diversity in the American
Bar Association, 2002-03 A.B.A. COMM'N ON RACIAL AND ETHNIC DIVERSITY IN THE PROFESSION
12-13 (finding that of the 137,480 members of the ABA that identified themselves by race or ethnicity,
9.24% were African American, Asian Pacific American, Hispanic, Native American, or other).
90. See E-mail from Charmy Medlin, Membership Services Manager, South Carolina Bar, to
Laurel Rosenberg, Law Student, University of South Carolina School of Law (Oct. 20, 2003, 14:59:25
EST) (on file with author). There are currently 10,946 members of the South Carolina Bar; 6,873
members have supplied ethnic information, and 472 (6.87%) of these members responded that they are
minorities or belong to more than one race.
91. See UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH CAROLINA SCHOOLOF LAW CATALOG 18 (2004) [hereinafter LAW
SCHOOL CATALOG].
92. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION J.D. DEGREES, 1984-2002, (finding that in 2002, minorities
accounted for 20% of total law student enrollment nationwide), at http://www.abanet.org/
legaled/statistics/jd.html (last visited Jan. 11, 2004) (on file with author).
93. UNIV. OF S.C. SCH. OF LAW, ANNUAL REPORT ON ADMISSIONS, CLASS OF 2005, at 11 (2002).
94. A proper statistical analysis of the minority representation at the USC School of Law would
require detailed data of the university's undergraduate minority population, the state's minority
population, and other factors beyond the scope of this Note.
95. Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2334 (2003).
2004]
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all applications.96 In addition to considering the applicant's academic background
and activities, "consideration is given to applicants who have overcome obstacles
to good performance in the educational system... including physical disability and
family socioeconomic status."97 This language does not formally recognize racial
diversity as a goal or factor in the admissions process. However, considering the
low representation of minorities at the USC School of Law in conjunction with the
Supreme Court's recent determination that racial diversity in higher educational
student bodies is such an important state interest that it passes the strictest of
constitutional scrutiny, the USC School of Law should formally recognize this
important interest.
Much of the USC School of Law's current admissions policy is already in line
with Grutter. The admissions committee reviews each applicant's file, giving
consideration to multiple factors, including the applicant's academic background.9
Adding racial consideration would not require a complicated restructuring of the
admissions decisions, but would simply necessitate decisionmakers to consider an
additional factor.
Language should be added to the admissions policy set forth in the USC School
of Law's Catalog stating that the attainment of a diverse student body is of great
importance to the school. The school should seek to enroll students that will add
to this diversity by considering differences in past work and school experiences,
community involvement, race or national origin, or ability to overcome obstacles
in the educational system. However, simply adding language to the admissions
policy will not cure the low representation of minorities in the student body or the
legal community as a whole. It is important that the school tailor its system of
application review to include these considerations. Like the policy in Grutter, the
admissions committee at the USC School of Law must look at each applicant
individually, determining what characteristics may contribute to the diversity of the
student body. Among different qualities that are considered, minority status should
be considered an important attribute and be given significant attention.
By formally considering diversity in its admissions policy, the USC School of
Law will attract a more diverse student body. A commitment to diversity and
minority representation at the USC School of Law will result in more minority
students and lawyers in South Carolina.
IV. CONCLUSION
Until recently, the state of affirmative action in university admissions policies
was unclear. With the Supreme Court's recent decisions in Grutter v. Bollinger and
96. LAw SCHOOL CATALOG, supra note 91, at 18. While the Law School Catalog discusses
various non-academic factors that will be considered in the admissions decision, the policy makes no





South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 55, Iss. 3 [2004], Art. 10
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol55/iss3/10
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Gratz v. Bollinger, racial diversity has been declared a compelling state interest.
South Carolina, through its public educational institutions such as the USC School
of Law, has the opportunity to advance racial diversity in the school and the state.
Considering the low minority representation at the USC School of Law and within
South Carolina's legal community in general, the school should formally recognize
the importance of racial diversity. By incorporating language into the admissions
policy that recognizes racial diversity, the school will be able to attract a more
diversified student body. Moreover, by showing a commitment to minority
students, the school will draw and retain more minority students, thereby working
towards the goal enunciated in Grutter--elirninating the need for affirmative action
within twenty-five years.99
Laurel Rosenberg
99. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2347.
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